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Expedited Removal and Due Process: 
“A Testing Crucible of Basic Principle” 
in the Time of Trump 
Daniel Kanstroom* 
[A]liens who have once passed through our gates, even 
illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to 
traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process 
of law. 1 
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I. Introduction 
This Essay examines a twenty-year-old deportation system 
known as expedited removal that the government has intimated 
may be expanded.2 Invoking Henry Hart’s famous 1953 Dialogue, 
in which he wrote, “[J]udicial review in exclusion and deportation 
cases . . . provides a testing crucible of basic principle,”3 the Essay 
explores what that crucible is, what basic principles it invokes, and 
whom it is testing.  
All legal enforcement regimes confront two related but distinct 
fundamental problems. The first problem is that of balancing 
efficiency against (substantive and procedural) rights. The second 
problem is that of protecting society against potentially dangerous 
accretions of government power.  
Ronald Dworkin famously once referred to rights as “trumps.”4 
Rights, as the analogy to card games runs, demand that their 
holders are treated in unusual ways that may override even the 
most powerful social aims and government goals.5 This usage may 
now seem humorous, ironic, and perhaps tragic in the Trump era, 
especially regarding expedited immigration enforcement. Previous 
administrations and the federal judiciary must also, however, bear 
responsibility for the rather deplorable current state of affairs in 
expedited removal (and in other “fast-track” immigration 
systems).6 As the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) put it in 
                                                                                                     
 2. See infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text (recounting the expansion 
of expedited removal under the second Bush administration). 
 3. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of 
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1389 (1953) 
(emphasis added). 
 4. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (Harv. Univ. Press, 
1977). 
 5. See id. at xi (“Individuals have rights when . . . a collective goal is not a 
sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have 
or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon 
them.”). 
 6. See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND 
THE NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA (2012) (describing the rise of fast-track 
mechanisms). See also AM. C.L. UNION, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS 
THAT BYPASS THE COURTROOM 10–30 (2014) (critiquing expansion of such 
mechanisms); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the 
Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 3 (2014) (cataloguing removal 
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2002, “[e]xpedited removal . . . represented a dramatic assault on 
the due process rights . . . . [It grants] extraordinary and 
unprecedented power to low-level immigration officers to remove 
individuals without review and without a fair hearing.”7 
Such concerns transcend this specific system, as there are 
many other forms of fast-track deportation systems and no 
shortage of rights infringements even in “regular” immigration 
courts. Indeed, some judicial modalities raise similar concerns, 
such as the 2005 initiative called “Operation Streamline,” in which 
noncitizens faced routinized pleas and sentences before magistrate 
judges, in processes that raised substantial concerns about lack of 
proper representation, due process, among other issues.8  
Rights protection in enforcement regimes is typically 
accomplished by describing such rights in constitutions, statutes, 
judicial decisions, regulations, and other authorities.9 Another 
                                                                                                     
mechanisms); Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 
90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 193 (2017) (“[S]hadow proceedings . . . either entirely or 
effectively bypass immigration court adjudication.”); Kari Hong, The Costs of 
Trumped-Up Immigration Enforcement Measures, 2017 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 
119, 124 (2017) (discussing Trump’s executive orders); Jill E. Family, Beyond 
Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration 
Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 542, 579–82 (2011) (discussing 
diversions from immigration court).  
 7. Am. C.L. Union, ACLU Comments on INS Notice to Expand Expedited 
Removal, AM. C.L. UNION (Nov. 13, 2002), https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-
comments-ins-notice-expand-expedited-removal?redirect=aclu-comments-ins-
notice-expand-expedited-removal (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 694–98 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(recounting procedures under Operation Streamline); see also Daniel Kanstroom, 
Smart(er) Enforcement: Rethinking Removal, Structuring Proportionality, and 
Imagining Graduated Sanctions, 30 J. L. & POL. 465, 472 (2015) (“Such mass 
processing raises serious concerns about proper representation, due process, and 
many other important legal values.”); Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. 
Criminal-Immigration Convergence and its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 105, 107 (2012) (“[Since 1997 . . . approximately one million immigrants 
have been deported or removed from the United States as a consequence of a 
criminal conviction.”); JOANNA LYDGATE, ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF 
OPERATION STREAMLINE 4 (2010), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_ 
Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf (“Operation Streamline raises significant legal and 
policy concerns . . . .”). 
 9. See, e.g., Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d at 698–99 (reviewing guilty pleas under 
Operation Streamline for violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure). 
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protection mode is the development of oversight systems. The 
latter mode aims to protect society against potentially dangerous 
accretions of government power. This concern, which is subtler, is 
commonly denominated as the “slippery slope,” the “canary in the 
coalmine,” and, most venerably, “guarding the guardians.”10 It may 
also implicate concerns about “perverse incentives,” a framing that 
may apply both to government power and to individual actions.11 
Both problems—that of protecting basic individual rights and 
that of worrisome accretions of government power—have become 
especially acute in the Trump Administration. President Trump 
and his minions (including most prominently Jeff Sessions, John 
Kelly, Kris Kobach, and Stephen Miller) seem profoundly 
uncommitted to the ideas of rights for noncitizens (or their 
families), to the legitimacy of judges, and even, perhaps, to the rule 
of law other than in a crudely binary, instrumental sense.  
The “testing crucible” in Hart’s formulation12 also implicates 
“Trumpism,” which—to the extent that it is a coherent political 
ideology—embodies a resurgent nationalism of a type also now 
prevalent in Europe,13 Australia,14 and Israel,15 among other 
places, with impulses deeply connected to xenophobia and racism. 
This connects easily and fluidly to expansions of fast-track, 
rights-infringing systems of exclusion and deportation. Such 
trends fundamentally challenge the relationship between 
                                                                                                     
 10. See infra Part IV (reviewing oversight issues within United States 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)). 
 11. See infra notes 139–150 (noting CPB human rights abuses). 
 12. See Hart, supra note 3, at 1389 (presenting the crucible formulation). 
 13. See Simon Shuster, Steve Bannon Takes Trumpism to Europe and Gets 
a Rock Star’s Welcome, TIME (Mar. 7, 2018), http://time.com/5189141/steve-
bannon-zurich-speech-populism-tariffs/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (discussing 
Trumpism’s reception in Europe) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 14. See Ifran Yusuf, Trumpism Has Entered the Australia Mainstream, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/ 
trumpism-has-entered-the-australia-mainstream-20161124-gswift.html (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2018) (discussing the rise of Trumpism in Australia) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 15. See Oren Libermann, Israel and Trump: United Against the World, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/20/middleeast/israel-us-intl/index.html (last 
updated Jan 20, 2018) (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (reviewing Trump’s 
relationship with Israel) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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executive power and law, especially in regard to human and civil 
rights, and between territorial presence and rights.  
The traditional response lies within the realm of judges. 
However, meaningful judicial oversight of immigration 
enforcement has long been hindered by “plenary power,”: 
formalistic categories of civil/criminal and regulation/punishment, 
deep ambivalence about the rights of noncitizens, complexities of 
federalism, and—for some twenty years now—robust statutory 
preclusions of judicial review.16 Thus, because noncitizens’ rights 
are largely contingent on enforcement discretion, the question of 
what rights a noncitizen has is inextricably linked to how the 
government enforces immigration laws.17  
This Essay explores the contours of a debate that—to some 
degree—has occurred, and to a greater degree should be taking 
place within our legal system. It considers Executive Order 13768: 
Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States.18 I will 
also consider a Memorandum authored by John Kelly, 
Implementing the President's Border Security and Immigration 
Enforcement Improvements Policies.19 These executive 
pronouncements will be examined against the backdrop of the 
history of expedited removal, judicial responses to various 
challenges of that system and of President Trump’s “travel bans,” 
and recent judicial decisions that have impeded expeditious 
deportation enforcement.20 
                                                                                                     
 16. See infra Parts IV–V (discussing failings within CBP and potential 
solutions, including judicial review). 
 17. See infra Part IV (examining the apparent lack of rights in the current 
enforcement regime). 
 18. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 19. Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., to 
Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection et al. (Feb. 
20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_ 
ment-Policies.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., 90-DAY PROGRESS REPORT 
TO THE PRESIDENT ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 13767: BORDER SECURITY AND 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS 1–15 (2017), http://altgov2.org/wp-
content/uploads/DHS_EO13767-progress-report.pdf (reviewing progress on 
implementation). 
 20. I refer to the creative legal strategies in such cases (with approval) as 
“monkey-wrench lawyering,” in that their main purpose seems to be to slow the 
gears of the deportation machinery. 
1328 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323 (2018) 
 
Part II of this Essay describes expedited removal, as it was 
conceived, as it has developed, and as it may grow. Part III 
explicates President Trump’s Executive Order 13768 and the Kelly 
Memorandum that advocated expansion of expedited removal. 
Part IV explores various problems expedited removal raises and 
the particular dangers of its proposed expansion. These problems 
and dangers include predictable, and perhaps inevitable, rights 
infringements and agency power concerns that are specific to U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). The Essay concludes with 
exploration of judicial solutions and secondary agency possibilities 
that could maintain the basic purpose of expedited removal (a 
system that, for all its flaws, is superior to a wall or to outsourced 
Mexican migration enforcement) while offering more realistic and 
capacious protections against rights violations and agency 
misconduct. 
II. Expedited Removal, Then, Now, and Expanding 
Although history has shown that border control can never be 
perfect, US courts have long held—with only a technical exception 
known as the “entry fiction”21—that noncitizens on US soil are 
entitled to due process protections.22 The more particular question 
of the process due to a “clandestine entrant,” especially a 
noncitizen apprehended on American soil, near the border, soon 
                                                                                                     
 21. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) 
(finding that “aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally,” 
possess certain constitutional rights, but that “an alien on the threshold of initial 
entry stands on a different footing”). Arrival at a port of entry does not, however, 
constitute entry into the country. See id. at 213 (“In sum, harborage at Ellis Island 
is not an entry into the United States.”). Thus, for due process purposes, a 
noncitizen at a port of entry “is treated as if stopped at the border.” Id. at 215. See 
also Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188 (1958) (noting entry fiction applies 
to a noncitizen who is “paroled” into the country pending determination of 
admissibility). 
 22. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (stating that “once an 
alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes” because our 
Constitution provides due process protections “to all ‘persons’ within the United 
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, 
temporary, or permanent”); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) 
(“Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory 
is entitled to that constitutional protection.”). 
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after entry, has not been definitively resolved.23 It is thus 
unsurprising that various informal, fast-track removal 
mechanisms have been a feature of U.S. law (especially at the 
southern border) for many years.24 Some such systems have 
embodied a rough, tacit compromise in that they have allowed CBP 
agents to summarily remove people while not imposing the harsh 
consequences of formal deportation (primarily, a ban on re-entry of 
at least five years)25 unless those same people tried to return to the 
U.S. again.26 Such systems, were, however, politically challenging 
to defend, of dubious efficiency, and somewhat unstable 
theoretically. 
As the legal category of asylum developed after 1980, formal 
procedures became increasingly available even to those caught at 
the border or at ports of entry.27 Large numbers of migrants from 
Cuba and Haiti fleeing to Florida in the 1980s provoked some 
legislators to propose a program of “summary exclusion.”28 The aim 
“was to stymie unauthorized migration by restricting the hearing, 
review, and appeal process for aliens arriving without proper 
                                                                                                     
 23. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 94 (1903) (questioning “whether an 
alien . . . who has entered the country clandestinely, and who has been here for 
too brief a period to have become, in any real sense, a part of our population, 
before his right to remain is disputed”). 
 24. See, e.g., MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING 
OF MODERN AMERICA xxiv (2004) (noting that “illegal immigration is not anomalous but 
inherent to the regime of immigration restriction”); Marc. R. Rosenblum, Shifts in the 
US Immigration Enforcement System, HOOVER INST. (July 14, 2015), 
https://www.hoover.org/research/shifts-us-immigration-enforcement-system (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2018) (“In the twenty-five years before 1996, just 3 percent of all 
people expelled from the United States were formally removed . . . versus 97 
percent who were informally returned.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 25. See Inadmissible aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2012) (“Any alien 
who has been ordered removed . . . upon the alien’s arrival . . . and who again 
seeks admission within 5 years . . . is inadmissible.”). 
 26. See Rosenblum, supra note 24 (discussing informal removal). 
 27. See Lisa J. Laplante, Expedited Removal at U.S. Borders: A World 
Without a Constitution, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 213, 214, 219–20 (1999) 
(discussing immigration law prior to 1996). 
 28. See ALISON SISKIN & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL33109, IMMIGRATION POLICY ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS 3 (2005), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P13.pdf (reviewing exclusion’s legislative 
history). 
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documents at ports of entry.”29 Though not adopted then,30 
summary exclusion was revitalized in 1995 with a new name: 
“expedited removal of arriving aliens”31 and became law as part of 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) in 1996, signed by President Bill Clinton.32 As it evolved, 
this new system was applied both at the border and, later, to some 
“clandestine entrants.”33 
Essentially, expedited removal now allows agents of the 
executive branch to remove certain noncitizens quickly and, in 
many cases, completely outside of immigration courts and federal 
courts.34 It does this by drastically restricting a variety of due 
                                                                                                     
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. (“It was included and then deleted from legislation that became 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.”). 
 31. Id. at 3–4. 
 32. “The IIRIRA provisions amended § 235 of the INA. For an earlier enacted 
version of expedited removal see The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (AEDPA; P.L. 104-132, §422).” Id. at 4 n.18. See generally PHILIP G. 
SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE TO SAVE POLITICAL 
ASYLUM IN AMERICA (2000) (discussing immigration policy’s evolution in the 
United States); see also MARK HETFIELD ET AL., U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL VOLUME I: 
FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS, 1–2 (2005), http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/ 
default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/Volume_I.pdf (presenting 
legislative history). 
 33. See SISKIN & WASEM, supra note 28, at 2  
Under regulation, expedited removal only applied to arriving aliens at 
ports of entry from April 1997 to November 2002. In November 2002, 
the Bush Administration extended expedited removal to aliens 
arriving by sea who are not admitted or paroled. Subsequently, in 
August 2004, expedited removal was expanded to aliens who are 
present without being admitted or paroled, are encountered by an 
immigration officer within 100 air miles of the U.S. international 
southwest land border, and have not established to the satisfaction of 
an immigration officer that they have been physically present in the 
United States continuously for the 14-day period immediately 
preceding the date of encounter.  
(footnotes omitted). These entrants are technically known as “entrants without 
inspection,” or EWI’s. See INA 212(a)(6)(A): Entry Without Inspection (EWI), 
MESSERSMITH L., https://messersmithlaw.com/ina-212a6a/ (last visited Sept. 19, 
2018) (providing practical terminology usage) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 34. See AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL 1–2 (2017), 
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process protections that had been available to noncitizens who are 
caught at or (relatively) near US borders or ports of entry.35 It 
imposes mandatory detention and essentially eliminates hearing, 
appeal, and judicial review processes36 for most noncitizens 
arriving or caught (within 14 days of border crossing)37 in the 
United States without proper documents (there are special 
protections for asylum-seekers, discussed below). Noncitizens who 
have been expeditiously removed are barred from returning to the 
United States for five years.38  
Also, the statute deems certain noncitizens on U.S. soil to be 
“unadmitted.”39 Prior to 1996, a noncitizen denied admission at a 
port of entry was “excluded” from entry.40 The immigration 
statutes contained both specific exclusion grounds and special 
procedures that were less formal than those that governed 
deportations from the interior.41 The first critical fact as to which 
                                                                                                     
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/a_prim
er_on_expedited_removal.pdf (describing limitations under expedited removal). 
 35. See id. (“‘Expedited removal’ refers to the legal authority given to even 
low-level immigration officers to order the deportation of some non-U.S. citizens 
without any of the due-process protections granted to most other people . . . .”). 
 36. See id. (outlining the expedited removal process); see also SISKIN & 
WASEM, supra note 28, at 4–5 (describing the basics of removal). Judicial review 
of an expedited removal order is available in habeas corpus proceedings, but the 
review is limited to whether the petitioner is an “alien,” was ordered expeditiously 
removed, or was previously granted legal permanent resident (LPR), refugee or 
asylee status. See MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43226, AN 
OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION MATTERS 5 (2013), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43226.pdf (describing judicial review for those 
aliens not placed in regular removal proceedings). 
 37. See Designating Aliens For Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877, 
48877 (Aug. 11, 2004) (applying the day limit). 
 38. See Inadmissible aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2012) (“Any alien 
who has been ordered removed . . . upon the alien’s arrival . . . and who again 
seeks admission within 5 years . . . is inadmissible.”). 
 39. This colloquial term is not in the statute. See id. § 1182(6)(A)(i) (“An alien 
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in 
the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney 
General, is inadmissible.”). 
 40. See David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New 
Immigration Rules, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 673, 689 (2000) (noting the prior scheme). 
 41. See id. (“Formerly the main statutory distinction fell between exclusion 
cases and deportation cases . . . clandestine entry lasting but a few minutes could 
vault the individual into the more favored category of deportable alien.”). 
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procedures applied (with some technical exceptions) was where one 
stood at the time of arrest.42 Noncitizens who were expelled from 
the interior were “deported,” regardless of whether they had ever 
been lawfully present and regardless of how long they had been in 
the United States.43 This system dovetailed with prevailing due 
process norms that protected those who had “passed through our 
gates, even illegally . . . .”44  
The IIRIRA replaced this territorial conceptual dividing line 
between exclusion and deportation with the concept of 
“admission.”45 Those who had been lawfully admitted retained 
formal procedural protections.46 However, persons present in the 
interior without having attained lawful admission were treated 
substantively like those denied admission at a port of entry.47 And 
some of them lost virtually all procedural protections as well.48  
From April 1997 to November 2002, expedited removal only 
applied to arriving noncitizens at ports of entry.49 Even there it 
was strongly criticized.50 In November 2002, the Bush 
Administration expanded expedited removal to noncitizens caught 
within the United States who had arrived by sea but who had not 
been physically and continuously present in the country for two 
years prior to apprehension.51 This was a very important move, as 
                                                                                                     
 42. See id. (“[T]he boundary was marked by the concept of entry.”). 
 43. See id. (“[C]landestine entry lasting but a few minutes could vault the 
individual into the more favored category of deportable alien.”). 
 44. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). 
 45. See Martin, supra note 40, at 689 (“The 1996 amendments deleted the 
definition of ‘entry’ from the statute and replaced it with a definition of 
‘admission,’ which now marks the major statutory boundary.”). 
 46. See id. (“[G]rounds of inadmissibility apply both to persons at the border 
and to clandestine entrants who have never gone through the process of formal 
inspection and admission . . . .”). 
 47. See id. (“[N]o matter how long they have been physically present in the 
United States.”). 
 48. See id. at 689–90 (“After all, there was always a certain anomaly . . . in 
giving greater rights to persons who completely evaded border screening, while 
those who presented themselves for inspection as the law required were rewarded 
with constitutional limbo.”). 
 49. See SISKIN & WASEM, supra note 28, at 2 (recounting legislative history). 
 50. See, e.g., Laplante, supra note 27, at 215–16 (critiquing expedited 
removal in 1999). 
 51. See Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under 
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it internalized expedited removal. In August 2004, expedited 
removal was further expanded to many more people who were 
present in the U.S.: 
[T]o aliens who are present without being admitted or paroled, 
are encountered by an immigration officer within 100 air miles 
of the U.S. southwest land border, and cannot establish to the 
satisfaction of the immigration officer that they have been 
physically present in the United States continuously for the 
14-day period immediately preceding the date of encounter.52  
In January 2006, expedited removal was further expanded 
along all U.S. borders.53 Later that year, it was applied to “illegal 
alien families” apprehended in areas along the nation’s southern, 
northern, and coastal borders.54 In a remarkably Orwellian 
formulation, a DHS press release reported that to “house these 
families,” it opened a new 500-bed facility in Texas 
“specially-equipped to meet family needs.”55 Julie Myers, Assistant 
Secretary for ICE, coined a strange new phrase to describe family 
detention and quick deportations: “This new facility enables us to 
have deterrence with dignity by allowing families to remain 
                                                                                                     
Section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 
68,924, 68,924 (Nov. 13, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 235.3(b)(1)(ii) (2017)) 
(detailing the expedited removal process); see also SISKIN & WASEM, supra note 
28, at 2 (recounting legislative history). 
 52. SISKIN & WASEM, supra note 28, at 2. 
 53. See ALISON SISKIN & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL33109, IMMIGRATION POLICY ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS 6–7 (2009), 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20090130_RL33109_0da5394ccb73e22db62
86d4acd1385b88c40c35a.pdf (reviewing exclusion’s legislative history and 
expansion to all borders). 
 54. News Release, U.S. Customs & Immigration Enforcement, DHS Closes 
Loophole by Expanding Expedited Removal to Cover Alien Families (May 15, 
2006), http://www.fosterglobal.com/news/DHSOpensNewFacility.pdf. 
 55. Id. The facility is named after T. Don Hutto, who co-founded the 
Corrections Corporation of America in 1983 in Nashville, Tennessee. See 
DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, DON T. HUTTO RESIDENTIAL CENTER: IMMIGRANT 
DETENTION INSPECTION SERIES 2 (2016), https://www.detention 
watchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/Hutto%20Inspection_DWN%20and%20Gras
sroots%20Leadership_2017.pdf (recounting the facility becoming a family 
detention center in 2006); Corrections Corporation of America History, FUNDING 
UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/corrections-
corporation-of-america-history/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (describing the 
founding of CCA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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together, while sending the clear message that families entering 
the United States illegally will be returned home.”56 To use 
detention as “deterrence” would itself seem a violation of dignity, 
as well as an unconstitutional rights violation. The purported 
dignity of such deterrence was further called into very serious 
question with respect to how detention was implemented. 
Researchers discovered many serious problems at the facility, and 
reported the following: 
 Hutto . . . [looked and felt] like a prison, complete with 
razor wire and prison cells. . . . 
 The majority of children detained in these facilities 
appeared to be under the age of 12. 
 At night, children as young as six were separated from 
their parents. 
 Separation and threats of separation were used as 
disciplinary tools. 
 People in detention displayed widespread and obvious 
psychological  trauma. Every woman we spoke with 
in a private setting cried. . . . 
 [P]regnant women received inadequate prenatal care. 
 Children . . . received one hour of schooling per day. 
 Families . . . received no more than twenty minutes to 
go through the cafeteria line and feed their children and 
themselves. Children were frequently sick from the food 
and losing weight. 
 Families . . . received extremely limited . . . recreation 
time . . . .57 
 Access to counsel was extremely limited.58 
                                                                                                     
 56. U.S. Customs & Immigration Enforcement, supra note 54. 
 57. LOCKING UP FAMILY VALUES: THE DETENTION OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES, 
WOMEN’S COMM’N FOR REFUGEE WOMEN & CHILDREN & LUTHERAN IMMIGR. AND 
REFUGEE SERV. 2 (2007), 
https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/images/zdocs/famdeten.pdf. 
 58. See id. at 31–32 (describing access to counsel at Hutto as available, but 
with much to be desired). 
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As a result of such reports and, following a major lawsuit, 
conditions were improved somewhat.59 Still, family detention 
remains a major issue for expedited removal in the United States.60 
This is especially salient in the disastrous aftermath of the Trump 
Administration’s “zero tolerance” family separation fiasco during 
the summer of 2018.61 
Expedited removal itself raises major due process concerns 
because arrest, detention, being placed in expedited removal, and 
ultimately removal with a five-year ban on return, are all in the 
hands of executive agents.62 In asylum cases, an immigration judge 
may be involved but even then federal review is essentially 
precluded.63 In most cases, a person subject to expedited removal 
is detained, has no right to counsel, often has no time to 
communicate with her family members or to seek legal counsel and 
has no right to appeal.64 
                                                                                                     
 59. See ACLU Urges Congress to End Policy of Detaining Immigrant 
Children, AM. C.L. UNION (Aug. 27, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/news/landmark-
settlement-announced-federal-lawsuit-challenging-conditions-immigrant-
detention-center?redirect=cpredirect/31469 (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) 
(announcing a “landmark settlement with U.S. Customs Enforcement (ICE) that 
greatly improves conditions for immigrant children and their families 
inside . . . Hutto”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 60. Currently there are three immigration jails holding families. See Family 
Detention, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, https://www.detentionwatch 
network.org/issues/family-detention (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (noting the 
Berks, Karnes, and Dilley centers are in operation) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also Laura Smith, Here’s the Biggest Immigration Issue 
That Trump Isn’t Talking About, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 12, 2017, 11:00 AM) 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/01/family-detention-immigration-ref
ugees-texas-dilley/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (discussing the present state of 
detention) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
  61. See, e.g., Maya Rhodan, Here Are the Facts About President Trump’s 
Family Separation Policy, TIME, http://time.com/5314769/family-separation-
policy-donald-trump/ (last updated June 20, 2018) (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) 
(providing an overview of the zero tolerance policy) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 62. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (describing the state of 
expedited removal). 
 63. See A PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL, supra note 34, at 2 (noting that an 
immigration judge is limited to reviewing credible fear of return). 
 64. See id. at 1–2 (explaining the lack of rights or process given to those 
subject to expedited removal). 
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And yet, courts have largely acquiesced. Part of the reason for 
this was a preclusion of judicial review in the 1996 laws 
themselves. The statutes stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction 
to hear any challenge to the system, including challenges on due 
process or other constitutional grounds, other than in a lawsuit in 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia filed 
within sixty days of the system's implementation.65 
Defenders of expedited removal have long argued that federal 
judges would undercut the basic idea of expedited removal and 
would hinder the Attorney General’s ability to make managerial 
adjustments if there were to be “sudden shifts in caseload.”66 Some 
federal judges now rather routinely reject challenges. As one judge 
laconically put it in 2014, “[t]he expedited removal statutes are 
express and unambiguous. The clarity of the language forecloses 
acrobatic attempts at interpretation.”67 A counter-tradition 
sometimes recognizes the deep problems expedited removal poses, 
while still declining to intervene due to the jurisdictional 
impediments congress imposed. As one court put it in 2010:  
The troubling reality of the expedited removal procedure is that 
a CBP officer can create the . . . charge . . . then that same 
officer, free from the risk of judicial oversight, can confirm his 
or her suspicions of the person's intentions and find the person 
guilty of that charge. The entire process . . . can happen without 
any check on whether the person understood the proceedings, 
had an interpreter, or enjoyed any other safeguards.68 
As the court rather distressingly concluded, “To say that this 
procedure is fraught with risk of arbitrary, mistaken, or 
                                                                                                     
 65. See Apprehension and Deportation of Aliens, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1275, 1277, 1279 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012)) 
(codifying limited judicial review) (listing matters not subject to judicial 
review). In Am. Immigr. Law. Ass’n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 47–62 (D.D.C. 
1998), aff’d, 199 F.3d 1352 (D.C.Cir. 2000), the court found that plaintiffs lacked 
standing to assert many of the challenges, and generally sustained the expedited 
removal system without much analysis. See id. (offering review of standing and 
removal procedures). 
 66. Martin, supra note 40, at 689. 
 67. Rodriguez v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. 6:14-cv-2716, 2014 WL 
4675182, at *2 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2014), vacated by Diaz-Rodriguez v. Holder, 
No. 14-31103, 2014 WL 10965184 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2014). 
 68. Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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discriminatory behavior . . . is not, however, to say that courts are 
free to disregard jurisdictional limitations.”69 
Such judicial acquiescence and the efficiency of interior 
expedited removal has inspired the government to expand its use. 
From a start of 23,242 in 1997, numbers rose to 89,070 in 1999, 
just under half of all total removals.70 However, from 1993–1999 
there were also more than 10 million recorded “voluntary 
departures.”71 These included both persons “under docket control 
required to depart” and not “under docket control,” those 
departures not under docket control being subject to much more 
informal procedures and looser record-keeping.72 As noted above, 
until 2002, expedited removal procedures applied only to “aliens” 
arriving at ports of entry.73 After 2004, the number of interior 
removals began to rise.74 By fiscal year 2013, some 44% of all 
removals from the United States were expedited removals, 75 which 
included removals from the interior. In 2016, of some 240,255 
removals ICE conducted, 174,923 were removals of individuals 
                                                                                                     
 69. Id. 
 70. IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 203 (2002), https:// 
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_1
999.pdf. 
 71. Id. at 250. 
 72. Id. at 250 n.2. 
 73. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (describing the original 
application); see also IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., supra note 70, at 203 (“In 
fiscal year 1999, the INS used these procedures with aliens arriving at ports of 
entry who illegally attempted to gain admission by fraud or misrepresentation, 
or with no entry documents, or by using counterfeit, altered, or otherwise 
fraudulent or improper documents.”). 
 74. The 2005 DHS Statistical Yearbook makes clear that removals include 
actions that “occur at the borders of the United States, in the interior of the 
country, and at designated sites outside the United States.” U.S. DEPT. HOMELAND 
SEC. OFF. IMMIGR. STAT., 2005 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 1 (2006), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Stati
stics_2005.pdf. 
 75. See JOHN F. SIMANSKI, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC. OFF. OF IMMIGR. 
STAT., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013 1 (2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2013.p
df; see also AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 1 (describing the rise in 
expedited removals). 
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“apprehended at or near the border or ports of entry.”76 This 
amounted to almost 73% of total removals. Of these, some 94% 
were apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol agents and then 
processed, detained, and removed by ICE.77 Thus, CBP is now in 
many respects the lead agency for removals.78 Moreover, there is 
now a backlog in the immigration courts of over half a million (due 
to years of stepped-up enforcement combined with massive 
underfunding of the regular immigration court system).79 This has 
created both a legitimacy crisis and leaves room for renewed 
support for expanding expedited removal.80 The Trump 
Administration has directed immigration judges to clear at least 
700 cases a year in order to receive a “‘satisfactory’ performance 
rating.”81 If taken seriously, such an order—which seems of 
dubious constitutionality if due process is to be taken 
                                                                                                     
 76. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016 ICE 
ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 11 (2016), 
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/removal-stats-201
6.pdf. 
 77. See IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., supra note 70, at 11 n.4 (“The 
remaining individuals were apprehended by CBP officers at ports of entry.”). 
 78. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the 
Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 3 (2015) (“[M]ore than half of the total 
population removed from the United States has bypassed a courtroom through a 
speed deportation program.”). 
 79. See Immigration Court Backlog Tops 500,000 Cases, HUM. RTS. FIRST 
(July 21, 2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/ 
immigration-court-backlog-tops-500000-cases (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) 
(“[C]hronic underfunding, hiring challenges, and shifting enforcement strategies 
have led to alarming backlogs in the U.S. asylum and immigration systems with 
more than 620,000 pending removal and asylum cases . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). For up to date statistics, see Immigration 
Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/ 
immigration/court_backlog/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (providing detailed 
backlog statistics) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 80. See Immigration Court Backlog Tops 500,00 Cases, supra note 79 (noting 
that wait times for resolution can be five years or more); Martin, supra note 40 
and accompanying text (establishing expedited removal as an alternative). 
 81. Nick Miroff, Trump Administration, Seeking to Speed Deportations, to 
Impose Quotas on Immigration Judges, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-
seeking-to-speed-deportations-to-impose-quotas-on-immigration-judges/2018/04/
02/a282d650-36bb-11e8-b57c-445cc4dfa5e_story.html?utm_term=.7bbff467336d 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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seriously— could tend to transform all removal hearings into what 
amounts to expedited removal. 
The Trump Administration has also intimated that it may 
seek to expand expedited removal beyond its current scope to 
entrants who have been in the U.S. just shy of two years.82 This 
would demand a serious constitutional reconsideration of the 
significance of such territorial presence for due process purposes.83  
The issues—essentially involving a tension between efficiency 
and rights—are among the most fundamental in the long history 
of U.S. immigration law. Consider a brief recitation of the 
arguments from the 1903 case of Yamataya v. Fisher84—with 
which all immigration law scholars are familiar: “Here is a person 
found dwelling within the United States; she is arrested and 
imprisoned by a ministerial officer; she is not permitted to see her 
friends or to consult with her attorneys; she is unable to speak or 
understand our language . . . .”85 The lawyers continue by 
highlighting what amount to hidden, deceptive—if not 
nefarious— practices:  
The officer does not give her any notice of the proceedings nor 
any opportunity to be heard, but goes about secretly collecting 
evidence against her, considering only such evidence as when 
unexplained, will suit his purpose. He takes advantage of her 
ignorance of our language and makes her give unintentional 
answers to questions which she does not understand.86  
The arguments against such practices made at the dawn of the 
twentieth century are worth remembering:  
[O]ur records will be searched in vain for authorities sustaining 
such a proceeding, and its only parallel must be sought for in 
the history of the times antedating Magna Charta. Will the 
                                                                                                     
 82. See JOSE MAGAÑA-SALGADO, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., FAIR 
TREATMENT DENIED: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S TROUBLING ATTEMPT TO 
EXPAND “FAST-TRACK” DEPORTATIONS 3–4 (2017) (detailing the proposed 
expansion), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/2017-06-05_ilrc_report_fair_ 
treatment_denied_final.pdf. 
 83. See Martin, supra note 40, at 688–89 (reviewing the relationship of due 
process and territorial presence). 
 84. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
 85. Id. at 90. 
 86. Id. 
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highest court of the land hold this proceeding to be due process 
of law? It seems to us that to do so would be to strike a blow at 
the very foundation of free government.87 
The Court’s opinion in Yamataya was, to say the least, 
brusquely unsolicitous on the merits of the due process problems 
for those who do not speak English: “If the appellant's want of 
knowledge of the English language put her at some disadvantage 
in the investigation conducted by that officer, that was her 
misfortune . . . .”88 However, the case did establish the baseline 
idea that there are fundamental limitations on executive power, at 
least when it is applied on our territory.89 The exact limits are 
complicated, as interior expedited removal would be patently 
unconstitutional were the lines not somewhat ambiguous.90  
Though some courts have tended towards a 
binary— right/privilege—sort of model,91 later cases such as 
Landon v. Plascencia92 showed that, at least as to returning lawful 
permanent residents, a purely binary territorial model does not 
suffice.93 Recent challenges to the Trump “travel bans” also tend to 
contradict a bright-line territorial principle, albeit from a different 
direction.94 Another due process variant is more fluid, more 
                                                                                                     
 87. Id. at 91. 
 88. Id. at 102. 
 89. See id. at 100 (“But this court has never held . . . that administrative 
officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of 
persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of 
law’ . . . .”). 
 90. See id. (finding that the executive cannot take into custody and deport 
aliens who have “entered the country, and [have] become subject in all respects 
to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population” without due process). 
 91. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) 
(“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an 
alien denied entry is concerned.”). 
 92. 459 U.S. 21 (1982). 
 93. See id. at 32–34 (considering an alien’s rights when he resides, leaves, 
and returns to United States soil). 
 94. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly and explicitly rejected the notion that the 
political branches have unreviewable authority over immigration or are not 
subject to the Constitution . . . .”); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 755 (2017), 
vacated and remanded by 138 S. Ct. 377 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The President’s 
authority is subject to . . . constitutional restraints.”); Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded by 138 
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multi-faceted, and less purely dependent on territorial presence. 
One might return to the words of Henry Hart: “[C]ourts [have] a 
responsibility to see that statutory authority was not transgressed, 
that a reasonable procedure was used . . . and . . . that human 
beings were not unreasonably subjected, even by direction of 
Congress, to an uncontrolled official discretion.95 
This framework directs our attention to the fundamental 
problem with expedited removal: Its very existence—and its 
expansion—inevitably cause serious errors and dangerous 
deprivations of rights.96 The basic structure of the system, which 
insulates decisions of great magnitude from judicial scrutiny,97 is 
troubling. It clearly invites—indeed it incentivizes—a 
transgressing of statutory authority and uncontrolled discretion by 
officials on the ground. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor recent asked 
during oral argument in Jennings v. Rodriguez:98 “[In] what other 
area of law have we permitted a government agent on his or her 
own, without a neutral party looking at that decision, to detain 
someone indefinitely?”99 That, she continued, is 
“lawlessness . . . basically saying that we're not a country of law, 
that we're a country of arbitrariness . . . .”100 
Unless one has much greater confidence in Customs and 
Border Patrol agents than history and experience would warrant, 
expedited removal—especially if expanded—amounts to a 
systematic acceptance of arbitrariness by an agency long known 
for it. Indeed, the system is full of agency-perverse incentives.  
This is a concern commonly directed at noncitizens, and less 
frequently at immigration agencies. Judge Jay Bybee101 for 
                                                                                                     
S. Ct. 353 (2017) (“Congress granted the President broad power to deny entry to 
aliens, but that power is not absolute.”). 
 95. Hart, supra note 3, at 1390. 
 96. See Martin, supra note 40, at 700 (arguing against expansion due to 
overapplication risks). 
 97. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (outlining the lack of 
judicial oversight). 
 98. 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
 99. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 
(2018) (No. 15-1204), 2017 WL 4517127, at *6. 
 100. Id. at 8. 
 101. Human Rights Watch argued that Judge Bybee should have been 
“investigated for conspiracy to torture as well as other crimes.” No More Excuses: 
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example, recently bemoaned the “perverse incentives” that the 
territorial rights model might offer to “aliens attempting to enter 
the United States to further circumvent our immigration laws by 
avoiding designated ports-of-entry.”102 Government lawyers made 
a similar argument in the Third Circuit case of Castro v. 
Department of Homeland Security:103 “If the clandestine entrant 
were treated more favorably, that would create—and 
constitutionalize—a perverse incentive for aliens to cross the 
border surreptitiously rather than presenting themselves for 
inspection.”104 
Leaving aside many empirical, moral, and doctrinal questions 
about such concerns, perverse incentives run both ways. A rather 
casual dismissal of realistic concerns about agency practices is a 
strange hallmark of some judicial opinions. Courts may accept that 
“expedited removal proceedings permit no judicial or 
administrative review, which we assume would decrease any risk 
of error.”105 But the judicial conscience is salved by asserting that 
the “class of aliens” to which expedited removal applies is said to 
be “fairly narrow.”106 Further, some assert that “the analysis 
required to determine whether an alien may be subject to 
expedited removal proceedings is straightforward” or “a relatively 
simple exercise” about which too much concern is unwarranted.107 
But for many cases, both assertions are demonstrably untrue, 
especially for asylum-seekers and others who face severe harm if 
deported.108 Also, as discussed in Part IV, major mistakes are 
                                                                                                     
A Roadmap to Justice for CIA Torture, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 1, 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/01/no-more-excuses/roadmap-justice-cia-
torture (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 102. United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 
2017), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh’g, 868 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2017), and on 
reh’g, 705 Fed. Appx. 542 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 103. 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 104. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 21, Castro v. U.S. Dep’t 
Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016) No. 16-812, cert. den. 137 S. Ct. 1581 
(2017), 2017 WL 1046315, at *21. 
 105. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d at 1136. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
 108. See, e.g., A PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL, supra note 34, at 2 (noting 
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frequently made and CBP, a dangerously unrestrained agency, 
seems unable to reform many bad practices.109 Perhaps something 
more than a crude, conclusory utilitarian calculus is thus in order 
for federal judges?  
Let us now consider how immigration enforcement in the 
Trump Administration has related to expedited removal.  
III. The Trump Order and the Kelly Memorandum 
A. Executive Order 13768 
President Trump’s Executive Order 13768, Enhancing Public 
Safety in the Interior of the United States, appeared in the Federal 
Register on January 30, 2017.110 Like many immigration 
enforcement measures, it was ostensibly aimed not simply at 
unauthorized migration, but more broadly at “public safety.”111 
The Order’s underlying assumptions and rhetorical tropes reveal 
deep implicit ideas about how deportation law should be conceived 
and implemented. It begins with a strikingly broad statement that 
links immigration control to (undefined) ideals of national security 
and safety: “Interior enforcement of our Nation’s immigration laws 
is critically important to the national security and public safety of 
the United States.”112 
This is immediately followed by a set of common, if contestable 
assumptions: “Many aliens who illegally enter the United States 
and those who overstay or otherwise violate the terms of their visas 
present a significant threat to national security and public safety. 
This is particularly so for aliens who engage in criminal conduct in 
the United States.”113 
Obvious basic questions about these assertions include: How 
many such “aliens” present such a threat? What is the exact nature 
                                                                                                     
that “credible fear” must be evaluated). 
 109. See infra Part IV (discussing abuses by CBP). 
 110. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 111. See id. at 8799 (“[I]n order to ensure the public safety of the American 
people . . . .”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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of that threat? Why does a person’s immigration status matter if 
they commit a crime? 
The main goal of the Order is articulated boldly. Asserting 
first—in a highly dramatic and quite unusual formulation—that, 
“the Federal Government has failed to discharge this basic 
sovereign responsibility,” the Order declares that “[w]e cannot 
faithfully execute the immigration laws of the United States if we 
exempt classes or categories of removable aliens from potential 
enforcement.”114  
The Order then directs executive departments and agencies 
“to employ all lawful means to enforce the immigration laws of the 
United States.”115 Thus, in effect, the Order rejects any sort of 
discretionary, targeted, prioritized enforcement methods and 
aims, presumably, to exclude all who are subject to exclusion and 
to deport all who are subject to deportation. There is a certain 
superficial plausibility here—why not enforce all the immigration 
laws fully? The answer, of course, is that this is impossible for 
logistical, cost, and many other reasons. Indeed, the Constitution 
itself uses the word “faithfully” not “fully.”116  
B. The Kelly Memorandum 
Such unrealistic calls for full enforcement reverberate as we 
consider the Kelly Memorandum. On February 20, 2017, 
then-Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary John 
Kelly directed DHS to issue a Federal Register notice to expand 
the category of individuals subject to expedited removal.117 He 
wrote that he had the authority to apply, “by designation in my 
                                                                                                     
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed . . . .”). 
 117. Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., to 
Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection et al. 7 
(Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-t
he-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-
Policies.pdf (directing DHS to issue “a new Notice Designating Aliens Subject to 
Expedited Removal”).  
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sole and unreviewable discretion, the expedited removal 
provisions . . . of the INA to aliens who have not . . . affirmatively 
shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that they have 
been continuously physically present in the United States the 
two-year period . . . .”118  
What might this mean? One recent study has estimated that 
it could subject more than 300,000 people to expedited removal 
with increased support for CBP.119 We thus return to two 
fundamental questions: Is expedited removal inherently impossible 
to oversee sufficiently to avoid predictable rights infringements? 
Does expedited removal—by its very nature—pose a serious, 
perhaps unacceptable, risk of dangerous accretions of government 
agency power?  
Clearly, these are both theoretical and empirical questions 
which must be refined by adding “in the Trump Administration.” 
As David Martin noted—correctly in my view—“If we are to have 
an honest debate on the merits of ER, critics and reformers owe 
the public a more accurate picture of its real functioning.”120 This 
is undertaken in the next Section. 
IV. Which “Basic Principles”? Whose “Perverse Incentives”? 
A. The Recognized Problems of Expedited Removal 
The main justification for expedited removal was, first, its 
efficacy as a border control regime, primarily as to those with 
“frivolous” asylum claims.121 Secondarily, it is justified—at the 
border and internally—as enhancing enforcement through 
deterrence because, unlike simply returning people with no 
consequences, it imposes penalties on future possible re-entries.122 
                                                                                                     
 118. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 119. See MAGAÑA-SALGADO, supra note 82, at 4 (“The expansion . . . could 
subject a minimum of 328–440 additional undocumented immigrants to expedited 
removal.”). 
 120. Martin, supra note 40, at 681. 
 121. See SISKIN & WASEM, supra note 28, at 16 (“Proponents . . . contend that 
aliens use frivolous appeals to postpone deportation.”). 
 122. See Martin, supra note 40, at 675 (“[T]o lay the groundwork for more 
severe sanctions if they do not take the law enforcement hint . . . .”). 
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Finally, expedited removal is commonly justified as being focused 
on those with low “stakes,” as it were.123 But this is a defensive 
justification against critics.  
As noted, expedited removal has faced severe criticism from 
human rights advocates and immigrant rights supporters from the 
moment it was first conceived.124 Judges, too, as noted above, have 
recognized that the system is “fraught with risk of arbitrary, 
mistaken, or discriminatory behavior . . . .”125 Indeed, even the 
proponents of expedited removal have recognized its potential 
dangers. In 2000, in the most sustained and sophisticated defense 
of the program, David Martin offered a series of admonitions and 
suggestions to maintain the legitimacy of the system. Martin 
urged, in summary form, that we:  
1. Assure humane treatment and the ability to communicate 
with family and friends . . . ; 
2. Improve internal monitoring of secondary inspection . . . ; 
3. Provide for carefully designed outside monitoring and more 
complete  statistics . . . ; 
4. Limit ER to persons with fraudulent documents or no 
documents . . . ; 
5. Improve consultation arrangements . . . ; 
6. Avoid backsliding on key protections . . . ; 
7. Resist any temptation to apply ER routinely to 
EWIs . . . .126 
                                                                                                     
 123. See Martin, supra note 40, at 701 (relating the location of entry to the 
low stakes of removal); see also Koh, supra note 6, at 200–01 (critiquing Martin). 
 124. See Martin, supra note 40, at 674 n.2 (collecting critiques); Karen 
Musalo, Expedited Removal, 28 HUM. RTS. 12, 13 (2001) (criticizing lack of 
representation during secondary inspection interrogations); Michele R. Pistone & 
John J. Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to be Broken: How the Process of Expedited 
Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167, 175–93 (2006) 
(cataloguing errors in the expedited removal system); Jaya Ramji, Legislating 
Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117, 134–41 (2001) 
(offering critique of the credible fear standard, secondary inspection, and 
expedited removal). 
 125. Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 126. Martin, supra note 40, at 695–701. 
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 This is a thoughtful, useful, but rather optimistic list.  
Though this Essay will not examine each of these criteria in detail, 
let us focus on a few major issues. 
B. Detention 
A major impediment to assuring “humane treatment and the 
ability to communicate with family and friends”127 is detention. 
One simply cannot disaggregate the structural connections 
between the problems of expedited removal and detention.128 Let 
us start with the physical conditions. In one prominent case, for 
example, plaintiffs credibly alleged that,  
detainees are packed into overcrowded and filthy holding cells, 
stripped of outer layers of clothing, and forced to endure 
brutally cold temperatures. They are denied beds, bedding, and 
sleep. They are deprived of basic sanitation and hygiene items 
like soap, sufficient toilet paper, sanitary napkins, diapers, and 
showers. And they are forced to go without adequate food, 
water, medicine, and medical care.129 
Can the government “assure humane treatment” and maintain an 
ability to communicate with family and friends in the context of 
massive detention systems, many of which house people who have 
been arrested great distances away? How is communication to be 
facilitated? Who pays for phone calls? How can families find out 
where a detainee is housed? As many studies and legal actions 
have shown, the CBP and DHS record on such matters does not 
inspire great confidence.130  
Consider, too, whether CBP has avoided “backsliding on key 
protections” even for asylum-seekers, a group that is specifically 
protected by the legislation that created expedited removal.131 
                                                                                                     
 127. Id. at 695. 
 128. See, e.g., Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal 
Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2014) (noting that 400,000 people were 
subject to civil immigration incarceration in 2012). 
 129. Doe v. Kelly, 878 F.3d 710, 713–14 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 130. See infra Part IV.C (identifying CBP failures). 
 131. See, e.g., Castro v. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 426–27 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (reviewing statutory protections). 
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Despite an ostensibly protective regime, many studies, over many 
years, have repeatedly found deficiencies in CBP processes to 
identify, adjudicate and protect asylum claims.132 
A recent study has also concluded that expedited removal and 
detention pose particular dangers to “women and their children 
held in detention centers in rural, isolated locations in Texas and 
Pennsylvania.”133 As the study noted, “Given that very few 
asylum-seeking families speak English, most have experienced 
significant trauma in their countries or during their journeys 
north, and they have no right to government-appointed legal 
counsel, the bureaucratic hurdles can be insurmountable.”134 The 
solution is “a robust legal process and legal assistance . . . .”135 But 
this, according to Martin and others, is precisely what expedited 
removal was designed to avoid.136 We face, in short, what seems to 
be an intractable dilemma.137 
                                                                                                     
 132. See, e.g., ELIZABETH CASSIDY & TIFFANY LYNCH, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM 
SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 20 (2016), https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/ 
files/Barriers%20To%20Protection.pdf (“Despite the small sample of CBP 
interviews observed, USCIRF found several examples of non-compliance with 
required procedures . . . .”); Clara Long, “You Don’t Have Rights Here”: US Border 
Screening and Returns of Central Americans to Risk of Serious Harm, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (OCT. 16, 2014) https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/10/16/ 
you-dont-have-rights-here/us-border-screening-and-returns-central-americans-
risk (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (finding that CBP “cursory screening fails to 
identify [asylum seekers]” and that “border officials . . . pressured them to 
abandon their claims”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 133. See KATHRYN SHEPHERD & ROYCE BERNSTEIN MURRAY, AM. IMMIGR. 
COUNCIL, THE PERILS OF EXPEDITED REMOVAL: HOW FAST-TRACK DEPORTATIONS 
JEOPARDIZE ASYLUM SEEKERS 1 (2017), https://www.americanimmigration 
council.org/sites/default/files/research/the_perils_of_expedited_removal_how_fas
t-track_deportations_jeopardize_detained_asylum_seekers.pdf (“[E]xpedited 
removal, in conjunction with detention often results in disadvantaging . . . women 
and their children held in . . . Texas and Pennsylvania.”). 
 134. See id. at 5. 
 135. See id. at 26. 
 136. See supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text (describing the 
rationale of proponents of expedited removal). 
 137. But see Kari E. Hong & Stephen Manning, Getting it Righted: Access to 
Counsel in Rapid Removals, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 673, 693 (2018) (asserting that 
legal representation does not necessarily slow down expedited removal). 
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C. The Problems of CBP 
The recent history of CBP inspires justifiable fears that a 
surge in hiring or an expansion of mandate (per the Kelly 
Memorandum) would be accompanied by inadequate supervision, 
misconduct, impunity, and corruption. A rather tactfully entitled 
2017 report by anthropologist Josiah Heyman, Why Caution is 
Needed Before Hiring Additional Border Patrol Agents and ICE 
Officers,138 offers useful insights and admonitions based on 
extensive past studies of CBP and ICE. Heyman recounts that CBP 
expansion—from 4,287 agents in Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 to 19,828 
in FY 2016—has been accompanied by concomitant increases in 
civil rights and constitutional violations, misuse of force, off-duty 
crimes like domestic violence, and corruption, “including taking 
bribes to smuggle drugs or people.”139 The Center for Investigative 
Reporting confirmed 153 investigations of CBP personnel between 
2000 and 2013.140  
Similarly concerning are the frequent, dramatic reports of 
excessive force by CBP agents. There were some 1,700 allegations 
of excessive force against CBP from 2007 to 2012.141 Such 
allegations declined by 26% between FY 2013 and FY 2015; but 
then rose by 21% in FY 2016.142 As Heyman concludes, “the agency 
has not adequately confronted the vulnerabilities that could result 
from the poor management of a mass recruitment of new 
agents.”143 
It is undoubtedly difficult for researchers to catalogue and 
document abuses by CBP agents because the victims of such 
misconduct are often quickly deported under expedited removal.144 
                                                                                                     
 138. JOSIAH HEYMAN, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, WHY CAUTION IS NEEDED BEFORE 
HIRING ADDITIONAL BORDER PATROL AGENTS AND ICE OFFICERS (2017), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/why_ca
ution_is_needed_before_hiring_additional_border_patrol_agents_and_ice_officers_
final.pdf. 
 139. See id. at 2 (quoting the Associated Press). 
 140. Id. at 3. 
 141. Id. at 5. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (presenting the removal 
process). 
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However, in a 2013 survey of 1,095 deported Mexicans, more than 
100 reported physical abuse by U.S. authorities and more than 200 
reported verbal abuse.145 Earlier surveys of deported Salvadorans 
yielded similar results.146 In 2015, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) reported “agents’ violent, reckless, and threatening 
conduct, including physically assaulting non-threatening 
motorists; driving aggressively and tailgating at high speeds; 
wielding weapons, including knives, electroshock weapons, and 
assault rifles in routine traffic encounters; threatening to shoot 
motorists or their pets; and mocking and insulting motorists with 
profane and derogatory language.”147  
Moreover, there have been tremendous discrepancies between 
CBP and others about agency oversight of complaints of illegal and 
unconstitutional actions by Border Patrol agents, such as 
unjustified searches and seizures.148 This comports with other 
findings of lax agency oversight and impunity. A 2014 study found 
that, of “809 complaints alleging abuse against Border Patrol 
agents between January 2009 and January 2012 . . . among those 
cases in which a formal decision was issued, 97% resulted in no 
action taken.”149  
Numerous studies have also found a pervasive, dangerous 
“code of silence” in CBP.150 Indeed, DHS itself concluded that “the 
‘code’ presents an insidious challenge to workforce integrity, and 
requires explicit, targeted and sustained attention.”151 In 2016, 
James Tomsheck described CBP culture as “very different from the 
rest of U.S. law enforcement. They were an agency that had not 
                                                                                                     
 145. HEYMAN, supra note 138, at 7. “The Border Patrol was involved in 67 
percent of the physical abuses and 75 percent of verbal abuse incidents.” Id. 
 146. See id. (“This corresponds closely to rates reported in two previous 
systematic surveys of deported Salvadorans.”). 
 147. Id.  
 148. See id. (noting mismatch in reporting incidents between Arizona Border 
Patrol and DHS oversight agencies). 
 149. Id. at 9. 
 150. See, e.g., HEYMAN, supra note 138, at 9 (“[A]n unwritten rule not to report 
another colleague’s errors, misconducts, or crimes . . . .”); TODD MILLER, BORDER 
PATROL NATION: DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONT LINES OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
83– 103 (2014) (reviewing a Border Patrol officer’s difficulties within the agency 
after being the subject of a Report of Unethical Behavior). 
 151.  HEYMAN, supra note 138, at 9. 
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always been held accountable.”152 During the Obama 
Administration, DHS promulgated some reforms for CBP.153 
However, the agency’s problems have clearly long been deep and 
widespread. As Josiah Heyman reports, most of these reforms have 
not been implemented.154 
V. Possible Solutions 
A. Habeas Reform and Judicial Review 
Short of eliminating expedited removal or drastically 
overhauling CBP, meaningful judicial oversight of CBP actions 
would seem to be a potentially effective safeguard. However, as 
noted above, the same 1996 statutes that authorized expedited 
removal severely limited the federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear 
challenges on due process or other constitutional 
grounds.155 Presumably, if Secretary Kelly’s expansion were 
undertaken, some avenues would be open.156 Still, habeas 
review— the main avenue for constitutional challenges—is well 
described as “minimal.”157  
                                                                                                     
 152. Id. at 10. 
 153. See id. at 12 (noting that there were over fifty-three recommendations). 
 154. See id. (“Although some recommendations have been undertaken, most 
have not.”). 
 155. See Laura W. Murphy & Timothy Edgar, ACLU Comments on INS Notice 
to Expand Expedited Removal, AM. C.L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-
comments-ins-notice-expand-expedited-removal?redirect=aclu-comments-ins-
notice-expand-expedited-removal (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (“Expedited 
removal . . . currently permits the expulsion, without further review and without 
a hearing, of individuals who arrive at the border without valid travel 
documents.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); supra note 65 
and accompanying text (describing the courts’ limitations). 
 156. Federal courts have reviewed some legal questions regarding expedited 
removal. See, e.g., Pena v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 452, 456–57 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the statute retain some avenues of judicial 
review, limited though they may be.”). 
 157. See NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAW. GUILD, EXPEDITED 
REMOVAL: WHAT HAS CHANGED SINCE EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13767, BORDER 
SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS (ISSUED ON JANUARY 25, 
2017) 4 (2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default 
/files/practice_advisory/final_expedited_removal_advisory-_updated_2-21-17.pdf 
(“Litigation concerning the scope of habeas review . . . is minimal.”); Smith v. U.S. 
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Perhaps the last frontier for substantial constitutional 
challenges to expedited removal practices is the Suspension 
Clause.158 In the 2016 Third Circuit case of Castro v. United States 
Department of Homeland Security,159 twenty-eight families sought 
review of their expedited removal orders based on asylum officers’ 
negative “credible fear determinations.”160 They asserted that if 
the expedited removal statute were not construed to provide for 
judicial review of such claims, the Suspension Clause would be 
violated.161 The Third Circuit held that because petitioners were 
“seeking initial admission to the United States,” they had no right 
to habeas review under the Suspension Clause even though the 
petitioners had physically entered the United States before being 
arrested by CBP.162 Thus, the case presented an apparent conflict 
between statutory designation of petitioners as seeking admission 
and their actual presence on U.S. soil.  
The court, however, reasoned that there is “a two-step inquiry 
whereby courts must first determine whether a given habeas 
petitioner is prohibited from invoking the Suspension Clause due 
to some attribute of the petitioner or to the circumstances 
surrounding his arrest or detention.”163 Contrary to the 
government’s position, which had focused on the second step in this 
analysis, the court ruled that petitioners failed at the first step 
“because the Supreme Court has unequivocally concluded that ‘an 
alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a 
privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his 
application.’”164 This may be true for some of those who have not 
                                                                                                     
Customs & Border Prot., 741 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We nevertheless 
hold that Smith is not entitled to the hearing he seeks, because as applied [the 
statute] does not allow review beyond the confines of the statute.”). 
 158. The Ninth Circuit avoided this issue in Smith, 741 F.3d at 1022 n.6 
(“[W]e need not reach the question of whether . . . petitioner . . . might still have 
claims under the Suspension Clause . . . .”). 
 159. 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. den. 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017). 
 160. Id. at 424–25. 
 161. See id. at 429 (“Petitioners challenge on appeal the District Court’s 
holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction . . . as well as the Court’s 
conclusion that [the statute] does not violate the Suspension Clause.”). 
 162. See id. at 445–46 (denying the petitioners’ claims). 
 163. Id. at 445 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008)). 
 164. Id. 
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physically set foot on US soil, but it is far from clear as to those 
who are already physically present.165 
The Third Circuit panel also thought it important that 
“[p]etitioners were each apprehended within hours of 
surreptitiously entering the United States . . . .”166 This led the 
panel to opine that, “we think it appropriate to treat them as 
‘alien[s] seeking initial admission to the United States.’”167 This 
was surely a rather abrupt and summary resolution of a major 
doctrinal dilemma about which the Supreme Court has never been 
clear.168 It requires a much more thorough, nuanced, and 
historically informed analysis than “we think it appropriate.”169 
Nevertheless, the Castro court found that the families could not 
“invoke the Constitution, including the Suspension Clause, in an 
effort to force judicial review beyond what Congress has already 
granted them.”170 If accepted by the Supreme Court, such 
reasoning would essentially confirm that much of the United 
States is now a Constitution-free zone.  
                                                                                                     
 165. See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of 
location and limits on executive power). 
 166. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 445 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text (reviewing the ambiguity). 
 169. Castro, 835 F.3d at 445. The Castro court also strangely conflated due 
process and Suspension Clause analysis—as Steve Vladeck notes, aspects of the 
Castro court’s opinion can charitably be termed “simply nuts” because the court 
seems to imply that non-citizens physically present within the United States are 
less entitled to Suspension Clause protections than enemy belligerents detained 
outside the territorial United States. Steve Vladeck, Third Circuit Holds 
Suspension Clause Does Not Apply to Non-Citizens Physically (but Not Lawfully) 
Present in the United States, JUST SEC. (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.justsecurity. 
org/32597/circuit-holds-suspension-clause-apply-non-citizens-physically-but-
lawfully-present-united-states/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Steve Vladeck, More Trouble for 
Undocumented Immigrants and the Suspension Clause, JUST SEC. (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/53822/trouble-undocumented-immigrants-suspensi
on-clause (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (reviewing a companion Ninth Circuit case) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 170. Castro, 835 F.3d at 446. 
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The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Castro in April 
2017.171 But the basic issues continue to percolate.172 In the Ninth 
Circuit, for example, another challenge to expedited removal 
brought by an asylum seeker could result in a split from Castro.173 
Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Tamil asylum seeker who fled Sri 
Lanka after claiming that he was abducted and tortured, was 
apprehended shortly after crossing the US border.174 He was given 
an expedited removal order “after the government determined that 
he did not have a credible fear of persecution.”175 He challenged 
this disposition through a habeas petition.176 District Court Judge 
Anthony J. Battaglia found that the unavailability of habeas for 
noncitizens subject to expedited removal did not violate the 
Suspension Clause.177 In a remarkably chilling passage, the court 
recited the facts of the case, accepted as true for these purposes:  
In 2014, Petitioner was approached by men on his farm who 
identified themselves as government intelligence officers and 
called Petitioner by his name. Petitioner was then pushed into 
a van where he was bound, beaten, and interrogated about his 
                                                                                                     
 171. See Castro v. Dept. Homeland Sec., 137 S. Ct. 1581, 1581 (2017) (denying 
cert). 
 172. In Kabenga v. Holder, 76 F. Supp. 3d 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), a New York 
district court judge found that a petitioner with a bona fide claim that his lawful 
permanent resident status had not been lawfully terminated at the time he was 
subject to expedited removal was entitled to a stay of removal and an immigration 
court hearing. See id. at 481, 486 (establishing facts and issuing a stay); Kabenga 
v. Holder, No. 14 Civ. 9084 (SAS), 2015 WL 728205, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2015) 
(granting the habeas petition). The case is currently before the Second Circuit. 
Kabenga v. Lynch, No. 15-1367 (2d Cir. filed Apr. 27, 2015). 
 173. I have signed an amicus brief in support of the Petitioner in this case. 
See Brief of Scholars of Immigration Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-55313 (9th Cir. 
Mar. 8, 2018) (arguing in favor of due process for all persons within the United 
States). 
 174. See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 287 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 
1078–79 (S.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-55313 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2018) 
(recounting torture event before noting that, “Petitioner entered the United 
States where he was apprehended by a Border Patrol Agent”). 
 175. Id. at 1079. 
 176. See id. at 1080 (“Petitioner’s emergency motion for a stay of removal 
devotes an entire section to asserting that this Court has jurisdiction to hear his 
Petition . . . .”). 
 177. See id. at 1082 (collecting cases to support the ruling). 
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political activities . . . . Petitioner then endured additional 
torture before he woke up in a hospital where he spent several 
days recovering. . . . Petitioner went into hiding in Sri Lanka 
and India, and then in 2016 he fled the country.178  
Notwithstanding the terrible power of these facts, the court 
concluded that the “strict restraints on this Court’s jurisdictional 
reach to review expedited removal orders does not violate the 
Suspension Clause.”179 The essential, if rather chilling principle is 
that “a litigant may be unconstitutionally denied a forum when 
there is absolutely no avenue for judicial review of a colorable claim 
of constitutional deprivation.”180 The judge also expressly cited the 
district court opinion in Castro, the “analysis and ultimate 
conclusion [of which] are incredibly persuasive to the Court.”181 
Thuraissigiam’s habeas petition was thus dismissed and his 
motion for an emergency stay of removal was denied.182 If legal 
challenges of this type are indeed a “testing crucible,” it is hard to 
imagine a more tragic conclusion than this:  
The Court does not downplay the important role courts across 
the nation have in safeguarding the reliability and fairness of 
the immigration process. However, no matter how credible 
Petitioner’s claims of fear may be and the purported harsh 
consequences that may come to him if he is removed to his 
native country, the limited scope of this Court’s judicial review 
over expedited removal orders restricts it from hearing 
Petitioner’s claims.183 
The case is now before the Ninth Circuit on appeal.184 The 
essence of Petitioners’ argument is that “noncitizens have always 
been able to test the legality of their removal through habeas 
                                                                                                     
 178. Id. at 1078 (internal citations omitted). 
 179. Id. at 1082. 
 180. Id. (citing Pena v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 452, 456 (9th Cir. 2015)); see also id. 
(citing Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1141–42 (9th 
Cir. 2008) for the proposition that “narrow habeas review . . . does not violate the 
Suspension Clause”). 
 181. Thuraissigiam, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 1083. 
 182. See id. at 1083–84 (declaring final orders).  
 183. Id. at 1083. 
 184. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 287 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (S.D. 
Cal.), appeal docketed, No. 18-55313 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2018). 
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corpus, and neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever 
allowed Congress to eliminate that review.”185 If the District Court 
were to be affirmed, it would thus be the first time that either the 
Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court “permitted a noncitizen who 
entered the country to be removed without judicial scrutiny of the 
legality of the removal.”186 
B. Lawyers? 
One of the most problematic aspects of expedited removal 
cases is the extreme difficulty in obtaining counsel. As many 
studies have shown, counsel can make a dramatic difference in 
outcomes in “regular” removal cases.187 And yet, claims of a mere 
right to access to counsel—not a right to appointed counsel—in 
expedited removal have rarely been brought and, so far as I am 
aware, have never succeeded.188 For most of expedited removal’s 
existence, the agencies in charge have strenuously resisted 
allowing counsel to participate in the process.189  
In a recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. 
Peralta-Sanchez,190 a panel found that a noncitizen had no Fifth 
Amendment due process right to hire counsel in expedited 
removal.191 Although the court’s opinion has since been 
                                                                                                     
 185. Opening Brief of Appellant at 17, Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., No. 18-55313 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2018). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to 
Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (“Moreover, we find 
that immigrants with attorneys fared far better . . . .”). 
 188. See KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43613, ALIEN’S RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS: IN BRIEF 1 n.4 (2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43613.pdf (collecting unsuccessful cases). 
 189. See EMILY CREIGHTON & ROBERT PAUW, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL BEFORE DHS 1 (2011) (“In many encounters with immigration agencies 
in the non-removal context, an attorney’s access to his or her noncitizen client is 
limited.”). 
 190. 847 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2017), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh’g, 868 
F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2017), and on reh’g, 705 Fed. Appx. 542 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 191. See id. at 1139 (refusing to find that “aliens who illegally enter the 
United States and are subject to expedited removal proceedings . . . are 
constitutionally entitled to counsel”). 
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withdrawn,192 its reasoning is significant, as this issue is likely to 
recur. The majority conceded that Peralta was entitled to some due 
process, but the key question was: “To what process—statutory 
and constitutional—was Peralta entitled?”193  
Regarding counsel, the court first concluded that there was no 
such statutory right, either through the immigration statutes or 
the APA.194 After asserting that the need for deference is 
particularly powerful in the area of immigration and 
naturalization, the court then rather quickly dismissed Peralta’s 
due process claim.195 Applying the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge196 
framework, the court first concluded, formalistically, that “[t]hese 
proceedings are essentially exclusion proceedings, even if they can 
in some instances be applied to aliens who may have technically 
effected entry into the United States—like Peralta . . . .”197 
Moreover, the court asserted that expedited removal only “targets 
aliens who have either no residence here or only a limited 
residence.”198 “Such an alien’s interest in remaining in the United 
States[,]” continued the panel, “is therefore much more limited 
than that of an alien already living here who has been placed in 
formal removal proceedings and stands to lose, perhaps, formal 
legal status here, and certainly the life he or she has created 
here.”199 As to the “risk of error” factor, “the class of aliens to which 
expedited removal applies” was said to be “fairly narrow,” and the 
analysis required was seen as “straightforward” and “a relatively 
simple exercise” (at least as to those who do not claim asylum).200 
                                                                                                     
 192. 847 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2017), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh’g, 868 
F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2017), and on reh’g, 705 Fed. Appx. 542 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 193. Id. at 1132. 
 194. See id. at 1134 (“Peralta has no statutory right to obtain counsel in an 
expedited proceeding.”).  
 195. See id. at 1142 (“Peralta had no Fifth Amendment due process right to 
counsel in the expedited removal proceeding . . . .”). Hong and Manning suggest 
that this may be incorrect. See Hong & Manning, supra note 137, at 696–703 
(discussing Peralta-Sanchez). 
 196. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 197. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d at 1135. 
 198. Id.  
 199. Id. Peralta had, in fact, first come to the United States in 1979. Id. at 
1128.  
 200. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d at 1136. 
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As noted above, these are all highly contestable claims which, one 
hopes, may eventually achieve more thoughtful and thorough 
resolution by the Supreme Court.  
 Peralta had argued that “counsel could provide assistance in 
cases like his, where a subsequent change in the law calls into 
question a previous order of removal.”201 The court disputed that 
expedited removal cases are sufficiently complicated to necessitate 
counsel.202 In my experience with post-deportation cases, however, 
there can be quite important roles for counsel to play.  
Finally, the majority saw counsel as a burden on the 
government in this context. There would be “costs to the 
government that would result from the inevitable delay if an alien 
is entitled to seek counsel” including detention costs, and the need 
for government lawyers to respond.203 In short, the majority 
concluded, introduction of counsel risks destroying the “expedited” 
removal process as such.204 There is clearly much with which one 
might argue in this analysis. But it does appear that, as of this 
writing, a right of access to counsel in expedited removal seems 
unlikely to be achieved through litigation.205 
This leaves us with few realistic solutions and with real 
concerns for the future of expedited immigration enforcement in 
the Trump era. Still, energetic lawyers may find ways. One can 
certainly envision, for example, a continuation of creative delaying 
(what I have called “monkey-wrench”) legal strategies such as 
those illustrated by a recent New York case in which a judge 
agreed that there must be, at least, “the freedom to say goodbye.”206 
In a recent Boston case, in which I appeared as an expert witness, 
a judge granted a preliminary injunction to slow the deportation of 
                                                                                                     
 201. Id. at 1137. 
 202. See id. (“Expedited removal proceedings, by design, involve none of these 
complications [present in removal proceedings] . . . .”). 
 203. Id. at 1138. 
 204. See id. (finding that expedited removal would turn into a trial-like 
proceeding). 
 205. But see Hong & Manning, supra note 137, at 678 (arguing “that 
speed . . . is compatible with meaningful access to counsel at three different 
stages of an expedited removal proceeding”). 
 206. Ragbir v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-236, 2018 WL 623557, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
29, 2018). 
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a group of Indonesian asylum-seekers on the grounds that 
compelling them to prepare motions to reopen from abroad could 
constitute irreparable procedural harm.207 Such strategies are 
clearly less capacious and optimal than a full throated acceptance 
of habeas corpus jurisdiction and due process protections, but they 
may be all that is left for the moment. Still, though they are easy 
to disparage and to mock, we should note the historical resonance 
of strategies of this type. Abolitionist lawyers famously used 
similar methods to oppose the Fugitive Slave laws in the 1850s.208 
One might return, again, to the words of Henry Hart:  
The law belongs to the people of the country, and to the 
hundreds of thousands of lawyers and judges who through the 
years have struggled, in their behalf, to make it coherent and 
intelligible and responsive to the people’s sense of 
justice. . . . The appeal to principle is still open and, so long as 
courts of the United States sit with general jurisdiction in 
habeas corpus, that means an appeal to them and their 
successors.209 
C. Post-removal Review? 
On the administrative/managerial side, I also would 
suggest— as a stop gap solution—a new idea: a post-removal 
review system. Even those who support expedited removal must 
recognize the prevalence of errors and the history of agency 
problems.210 It has become apparent that the number of wrongful 
                                                                                                     
 207. See Devitri v. Cronen, 289 F. Supp. 3d 287, 295 (D. Mass. 2018), appeal 
docketed, No. 18-1281 (1st Cir. Apr. 6, 2018) (finding that reviewing motion to 
reopen post-removal “does not meet the requirements of due process because of 
the significance of the liberty interests at stake”). What was perhaps most 
astonishing to ponder in this case was that the same judge concluded that she 
had no jurisdiction to review the argument that the petitioners would also face 
torture and persecution abroad. See Transcript of Motion Hearing on Preliminary 
Injunction at 31–33, Devitri v. Cronen, 289 F. Supp. 3d 287 (D. Mass. 2018) (No. 
17-11842) (expressing trepidation on ruling on torture claim). 
 208. See, e.g., In re Sims, 61 Mass. 285, 294, 310 (1851) (reviewing 
unsuccessful challenge as to the constitutionality of fugitive slave laws). 
 209. See Hart, supra note 3, at 1396 (presenting the crucible formulation). 
 210. See supra Part IV (reviewing mistakes and abuses in the system). 
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removals has increased and will likely continue to do so.211 If we 
are to be wedded to expeditious enforcement models, why not build 
in a safeguard? Let me emphasize what should be obvious: that I 
would not consider this a substitute for due process or counsel. It 
would merely be an extra layer of protection. A person who feels 
that an injustice was done in their case could contact this 
office— which should be staffed by independent attorneys—for a 
review of their matter. We have done this—at relatively little 
cost—at the Post Deportation Human Rights Project at Boston 
College Law School in conjunction with staff in Guatemala, and 
with input from NGO’s around the world.212 The complexities are 
not trivial; but the possible benefits are great. These post-removal 
attorneys might also be granted special access to the oversight 
authorities within DHS or, perhaps, to some special form of Motion 
to Reconsider by adjudicators. The oft-criticized incentives for 
“delay” would not be present. Presumably, only those who felt that 
that they were truly wronged would avail themselves of this 
long-shot remedy. Lawyers would not spend time on such cases 
unless they concluded that a real injustice had been done. My 
belief— based on many years of experience with such cases—is that 
many wrongs could be righted in this way. But let me be clear: this 
proposal should not be taken as an endorsement or a legitimation 
of expedited removal, as post-removal practice is difficult, 
cumbersome, and clearly inferior to representation and judicial 
review in the first instance.  
                                                                                                     
 211. See, e.g., Part V.A (reviewing modern challenges to wrongful removal). 
 212. See M. Brinton Lykes et al., The Post-Deportation Human Rights Project: 
Participatory Action Research with Maya Transnational Families, 34 PRACTICING 
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